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Disclosure Frequency Induced Myopia and the Decision to be Public 
 
 
Abstract  
 
This study examines whether disclosure frequency induced myopia influences the types of firms 
that go public and their choice of listing exchanges if they decide to do so. We find that the 
incentive to stay private in order to avoid disclosure frequency induced myopia creates a 
downward kink in the relation between the length of the cash conversion cycle and the 
proportion of public firms at the industry level around the time frame that corresponds to the 
mandatory reporting interval. Second, at the firm level, public firms with longer cash conversion 
cycles relative to industry peers are more likely to list on exchanges that require less frequent 
mandatory disclosure to minimize disclosure frequency induced myopia. Furthermore, when the 
mandatory reporting frequency increased from semi-annual to quarterly, we observe a sharper 
decline in the percentage of public firms from industries whose cash conversion cycles are 
between one quarter and two quarters relative to those from other industries both in the United 
States and in the United Kingdom.  
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1. Introduction 
This study builds on the theoretical framework of Gigler et al. [2014] and examines 
empirically whether disclosure frequency induced myopia influences the types of firms that go 
public and their choice of listing exchanges if they decide to do so. Gigler et al. [2014] relate 
managerial myopia explicitly to the frequency of financial reporting. They define mandatory 
disclosure as infrequent (frequent) when cumulative cash payoffs from a project are complete 
(incomplete) by the end of the reporting period and conclude that managers have an incentive to 
be myopic only under the scenario of frequent reporting.   
In practice, a firm has multiple projects concurrently, and the choice of a specific project 
(long-term versus short-term) is unobservable. Cash payoffs are observable, however, only on an 
aggregate basis for all projects. Analogous to Gigler et al. [2014], we classify mandatory 
reporting of a given interval as infrequent (frequent) when the mandatory reporting interval is 
longer (shorter) than a firm’s average length of cash payoffs from all projects. Empirically, we 
use the length of the cash conversion cycle as a proxy for the average length of cash payoffs 
from all projects. The length of the cash conversion cycle is defined as the average amount of 
time each net input dollar (including raw material, labor, and technology) is tied up in the 
production and sales process before it is converted into cash flow. Firms with longer cash 
conversion cycles are more likely to have projects whose cash payoffs are not complete within a 
given mandatory reporting interval.  
To validate the use of the cash conversion cycle as a proxy for the average length of cash 
payoffs from all projects, we find that publicly listed firms with cash conversion cycles longer 
than one quarter cut research and development expenses in the year of seasoned equity offerings 
(SEOs) to a greater extent than those with cash conversion cycles shorter than one quarter. 
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Furthermore, the difference in research and development expenses between these two groups in 
the year of SEOs is more pronounced when investors are impatient. Both sets of empirical results 
are consistent with the predictions from Gigler et al. [2014] that in response to price pressure 
from the public market, disclosure frequency induced myopia is present only under the scenario 
of frequent reporting, and that disclosure frequency induced myopia increases as price pressure 
from the public market increases.  
We then examine the effect of disclosure frequency induced myopia on the types of firms 
that go public and the choice of listing exchanges if they decide to do so. Disclosure frequency 
induced myopia is more (less) likely to be present when the average length of cash payoffs from 
all projects is longer (shorter) than the frequency of mandatory disclosure, which corresponds to 
the scenario of frequent (infrequent) reporting in Gigler et al. [2014]. Accordingly, the 
mandatory quarterly reporting in the United States creates a greater incentive for firms whose 
average length of cash payoffs from all projects is longer than one quarter to stay private to avoid 
disclosure frequency induced myopia, compared with firms whose average length of cash 
payoffs from all projects is shorter than one quarter.   
Given that the average length of cash payoffs from all projects contains a significant 
industry-specific component, we test the cross-sectional prediction at the industry level. 
Empirically, we look at the cross-section of all public and private firms in the United States and 
measure the proportion of public firms relative to all firms (including both private and public 
firms) at the industry level at a given time. Using the U.S. Census of Manufactures and 
Compustat, we find that, compared to the corresponding change in industries whose cash 
conversion cycles are shorter than one quarter, a one-day increase in the cash conversion cycle in 
industries whose cash conversion cycles are longer than one quarter is associated with an 
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additional 0.013% decrease in the proportion of public firms relative to the mean. The evidence 
suggests that disclosure frequency induced myopia is more pronounced when the average length 
of cash payoffs from all projects exceeds the frequency of mandatory reporting, which deters 
(encourages) firms in those industries from entering (to exit) the public market. 
Given that the average length of cash payoffs from all projects also contains a firm-
specific component, we explore the effect of the within-industry variation in disclosure 
frequency induced myopia on the choice of listing exchanges. Listing exchanges in different 
jurisdictions impose different mandatory reporting frequencies. For public firms, we hypothesize 
that firms with longer cash conversion cycles relative to their industry peers are more likely to 
choose a listing exchange that imposes less frequent periodic mandatory reporting to minimize 
disclosure frequency induced myopia. Empirically, we find that firms domiciled in the United 
Kingdom (U.K.) with cash conversion cycles longer than those of their industry peers were less 
likely to be listed on U.S. exchanges during the period from 2002 to 2006, when the frequency of 
mandatory reporting was quarterly in the United States and semi-annual in the U.K. 
Next, we examine the effect of the time-series variation in the frequency of mandatory 
disclosure on the types of firms that go public. Gigler et al. [2014] suggest that increasing the 
frequency of financial reporting increases price pressure, and this increased price pressure could 
induce firms to choose myopic projects in order to boost their current market prices. Intuitively, 
when reporting intervals are shortened as a result of increased disclosure frequency, the same 
firm is more likely to have projects whose cumulative cash payoffs are not complete within the 
shortened reporting interval. The increased incentive to be myopic is especially salient for firms 
whose average length of cash payoffs from all projects is shorter than the old reporting interval 
but longer than the new reporting interval because those firms view the old reporting regime as 
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infrequent, but view the new reporting regime as frequent. The shift from infrequent to frequent 
financial reporting creates a new incentive for those firms to stay private to avoid disclosure 
frequency induced myopia.  
The empirical results from both United States and the U.K. suggest that an increase in the 
frequency of mandatory reporting deters (encourages) more firms from entering (to exit) the 
public markets to avoid disclosure frequency induced myopia, especially in industries whose 
average length of cash payoffs from all projects is shorter than the old reporting interval but 
longer than the new reporting interval. More specifically, in the United States, compared to the 
corresponding change in other industries, the proportion of public firms in industries whose cash 
conversion cycles are between one quarter and two quarters decreased by an additional 0.864% 
from the period between 1965 to 1969 when the frequency of mandatory reporting was semi-
annual to the period between 1970 to 1974 when the frequency of mandatory reporting was 
quarterly. In the U.K., public firms from industries whose cash conversion cycles are between 
one quarter and two quarters accounted for a smaller percentage of all public firms in the period 
between 2007 and 2011 when the frequency of mandatory reporting was quarterly compared to 
the period between 2002 and 2006 when the frequency of mandatory reporting was semi-annual, 
after controlling for normal fluctuations in industry composition during these periods using U.S. 
firms.  
This study contributes to multiple strands of the literature. First, to the best of our 
knowledge, this is the first study to investigate whether disclosure frequency induced myopia 
influences a firm’s decision to go public and a firm’s choice of the listing exchange. We provide 
new empirical evidence on the economic consequences of mandatory reporting frequency. This 
study complements prior research by suggesting that the public market’s focus on short-term 
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earnings induces not only myopic managerial behaviors in publicly traded firms, but also 
influences a firm’s decision on whether to go public and the firm’s choice of listing exchanges. 
Second, this study provides new insights into the ongoing debate on the frequency of 
mandatory disclosure. More specifically, we find that an increase in the frequency of mandatory 
reporting deters (encourages) firms from industries whose cash conversion cycles are shorter 
than the length of the old reporting interval but longer than the length of the new reporting 
interval from entering (to exit) the public markets. The primary argument for increasing 
disclosure frequency rests on enhancing timeliness and transparency. A key argument against 
increasing disclosure frequency is that more frequent reporting forces managers of publicly 
traded firms to focus on short-run performance at the expense of long-run performance. Our 
findings suggest that regulators deliberating an increase in mandatory reporting frequency also 
need to consider the impact of such a change on the types of firms that choose to go public and 
the choice of listing exchanges.  
Furthermore, this study contributes to the literature on stock listing choice in an 
international context. Prior studies largely examine the cross-listing decision from the 
perspective of investor protection and corporate governance (e.g., Karolyi [2012]). A dominant 
paradigm is the bonding hypothesis proposed by Coffee [1999]. This study, in contrast, examines 
the choice of listing exchanges from an entirely new angle by investigating whether disclosure 
frequency induced myopia also plays a role in the decision while holding constant the origin 
country and the destination country. The findings suggest that for public firms, the firm-level 
cash conversion cycle relative to industry peers influences U.K.–domiciled firms’ decision to list 
in the United States, thereby providing supporting evidence that mandatory disclosure 
requirements have important economic consequences on the choice of listing exchanges. 
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Finally, this study complements the strand of literature that suggests an important 
interaction between capital market and product market behaviors (e.g., Chevalier [1995]; 
Hellman and Puri [2000]; Campello [2006]). For example, Chevalier [1995] and Campello 
[2006] find that the debt-to-equity ratio influences a firm’s decisions about the capacity and form 
of strategic alliances. Hellman and Puri [2000] find that the stake taken by venture capitalists 
influences a firm’s product market innovation strategy. All those studies examine whether and 
how a given financing choice influences product market behavior. In contrast, we examine how a 
given product market attribute influences the choice of whether and where to raise capital from 
the public market. Specifically, this study suggests that the length of the cash conversion cycle 
influences a firm’s decision to access the public market and this influence varies with disclosure 
regulations in the capital market.  
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 develops the hypotheses. 
Section 3 discusses the research design and sample selection. Section 4 presents empirical results. 
Section 5 concludes. 
 
II. Hypothesis development 
Prior theoretical studies suggest that price pressures from the public market affect 
managers’ decisions. For instance, Stein [1989] suggests that even though the market is fully 
efficient to the extent that the market correctly anticipates the equilibrium actions of the manager 
and correctly prices the firm, price pressure from the public market will still cause the manager 
to behave myopically when the market is unable to directly observe the manager’s actions. 
Furthermore, Gigler et al. [2014] relate managerial myopia explicitly to the frequency of 
financial reporting and to the degree of impatience in the capital market. They conclude that 
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price pressure created by frequent reporting induces managers to adopt a short-term perspective 
(myopia) in choosing projects.   
Throughout the study, we use the theoretical framework from Gigler et al. [2014] to 
develop empirical hypotheses. Mandatory disclosure is defined as infrequent (frequent) when the 
cumulative cash payoffs from a project are complete (incomplete) by the end of the reporting 
period. Assuming there are no conflicts of interest between corporate managers and 
shareholders,1 Gigler et al. [2014] predict that managers have an incentive to be myopic only 
under the scenario of frequent reporting when the firm’s specific project choice (long term versus 
short term) is unobservable. This is largely because frequent reporting results in price pressures 
that are analogous to the pressure caused by the premature evaluation of any action whose value 
is probabilistically evident only over the long term. These premature evaluations are tempered by 
subsequent evaluations, but the damage caused by early evaluations cannot be overcome when 
shareholders are sufficiently impatient. 
One could argue that accounting accruals mitigate the timing issue of cash flows (e.g., 
Dechow [1994]), and, therefore, the pressure caused by the premature evaluation is mitigated by 
informative accounting accruals. However, Ewert and Wagenhofer [2005] suggest that tighter 
accounting results in a strengthened relationship between accounting earnings and underlying 
transactions, which makes accounting accruals more “value relevant” and increases managerial 
incentives to engage in real earnings management (myopic behavior), such as cutting research 
and development costs. Therefore, the relation between accounting accruals and managerial 
myopia is ambiguous. This study adopts the assumption in Gigler et al. [2014] that cost outlays 
are perfectly measured and cash payoffs are independent intertemporally, and, therefore, there is 
no scope for informative accounting accruals.   
                                                 
1 In particular, managers act according to the preferences of the current shareholders. 
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In practice, a firm has multiple projects concurrently and a specific project choice (long 
term versus short term) is unobservable. Therefore, cash payoffs are observable only on an 
aggregate basis for all projects. Analogous to Gigler et al. [2014], we classify mandatory 
reporting of a given interval as infrequent (frequent) when the duration of the reporting period is 
longer (shorter) than a firm’s average length of cash payoffs from all projects. Accordingly, 
disclosure frequency induced myopia is more likely to be present when the mandatory reporting 
interval is shorter than a firm’s average length of cash payoffs from all projects, which 
corresponds to the frequent reporting scenario. In contrast, disclosure frequency induced myopia 
is less likely to be present when the mandatory reporting interval is longer than a firm’s average 
length of cash payoffs from all projects, which corresponds to the infrequent reporting scenario.   
Empirically, we use the length of the cash conversion cycle as a proxy for the average 
length of cash payoffs from all projects. The frequency of mandatory reporting for publicly listed 
firms in the United States is quarterly. If the cash conversion cycle is a valid empirical proxy for 
the average length of payoffs from all projects, it is expected that, in response to price pressure 
from the public market, managers in publicly traded firms whose cash conversion cycles are 
longer than one quarter exhibit a greater extent of myopia than those in firms whose cash 
conversion cycles are shorter than one quarter. Furthermore, the more impatient investors are, the 
greater the price pressure from the public market, and the greater the difference in managerial 
myopia between firms whose cash conversion cycles are longer than one quarter and those 
whose cash conversion cycles are shorter than one quarter. This leads to the first hypothesis: 
H1a: Managerial myopia in publicly traded firms whose cash conversion cycles are longer than 
one quarter is greater than that in firms whose cash conversion cycles are shorter than one 
quarter. 
H1b: When investors are impatient, the difference in managerial myopia between firms with cash 
conversion cycles longer than one quarter and those with cash conversion cycles shorter than 
one quarter is more pronounced.  
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Anecdotal evidence suggests that mandatory reporting is a factor that potentially 
discourages firms from going public. For example, Jonathan Klein, chief executive of Getty 
Images, commented, “We moved swiftly and adjusted our cost base, invested in our employees 
and were able to acquire our then second largest competitor at a knock-down price. . . . All of 
this was possible as a private company without the issues of quarterly reporting, providing 
guidance on earnings, a volatile stock price and external pressures” (Upbin [2013]).  
The anecdotal evidence raises the interesting question of whether disclosure frequency 
induced myopia is an economically significant factor in a firm’s decision to become a publicly 
traded firm. If so, the cross-sectional variation in disclosure frequency induced myopia is 
expected to influence the types of firms that go public. On the one hand, firms with longer length 
of cash payoffs from all projects have a greater need for external funds, and thus are more likely 
to access external markets, including the public equity market. On the other hand, disclosure 
frequency induced myopia deters firms from entering the public equity market. Disclosure 
frequency induced myopia is more (less) likely to be present for firms whose average length of 
cash payoffs from all projects is longer (shorter) than the mandatory reporting interval (Gigler et 
al., 2014). Accordingly, the relation between the average length of cash payoffs from all projects 
and the tendency to be public is not linear, but, rather, depends on the time frame into which the 
average length of cash payoffs from all projects falls. For firms whose average length of cash 
payoffs from all projects is longer than the mandatory reporting interval, the above-mentioned 
two effects work in opposite directions. In contrast, the incentive to stay private to avoid 
disclosure frequency induced myopia is much weaker for firms whose average length of cash 
payoffs from all projects is shorter than the mandatory reporting interval.  For the latter group, 
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the effect of a greater need for external financing for firms with a longer average length of cash 
payoffs from all projects dominates. In summary, the extra incentive to stay private in order to 
avoid disclosure frequency induced myopia triggers a downward kink in the relation between the 
average length of cash payoffs from all projects and the likelihood of being public around the 
time frame that corresponds to the mandatory reporting interval.  
Given that the average length of cash payoffs from all projects contains a significant 
industry-specific component, we hypothesize that, compared with the corresponding change in 
industries whose cash conversion cycles are shorter than one quarter, an increase in the length of 
the cash conversion cycle is associated with an additional decrease in the proportion of public 
firms in industries whose cash conversion cycles are longer than one quarter. This leads to the 
second hypothesis: 
H2: Disclosure frequency induced myopia is more pronounced when the length of the cash 
conversion cycle exceeds the mandatory reporting interval, which deters (encourages) more 
firms in those industries from entering (to exit) the public market. 
 
Furthermore, if a firm decides to go public, disclosure frequency induced myopia is likely 
to influence a firm’s choice of listing exchange. Listing exchanges in different jurisdictions 
impose different frequencies of mandatory reporting. For instance, during the period from 2002 
to 2006, the frequency of mandatory reporting was quarterly in the United States and semi-
annual in the U.K. In addition to the significant industry-specific component, the average length 
of cash payoffs from all projects also contains a firm-specific component. Relative to industry 
peers, a firm whose average length of cash payoffs from all projects is 120 days is more likely to 
view the quarterly reporting regime in the United States as frequent than will its industry peer 
whose average length of cash payoffs from all projects is 80 days. Accordingly, we hypothesize 
that a firm with a longer average length of cash payoffs from all projects relative to its industry 
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peers is more likely to choose a listing exchange that imposes less frequent mandatory reporting 
to minimize disclosure frequency induced myopia. This leads to the third hypothesis: 
H3: Public firms with cash conversion cycles longer than those of their industry peers are more 
likely to choose a listing exchange that imposes less frequent mandatory reporting to mitigate 
disclosure frequency induced myopia. 
 
Finally, we examine the effect of the time-series variation in the frequency of mandatory 
disclosure on the types of firms that go public. More specifically, we explore the changes in the 
frequency of mandatory reporting from semi-annual to quarterly in both the United States and 
the U.K. In the United States, the Securities and Exchange Commission required public firms to 
change from semi-annual to quarterly reporting in 1970. Starting January 20, 2007, the U.K. 
implemented the European Union Transparency Directive, which changed the reporting 
frequency of public firms listed in the U.K. from semi-annual to quarterly, even though the 
newly implemented quarterly reporting requirements were less extensive and stringent than the 
semi-annual reporting requirements.   
Gigler et al. [2014] suggest that increasing the frequency of financial reporting increases 
price pressure, which could induce a publicly listed firm to choose myopic projects in order to 
boost its current market price. Intuitively, when reporting intervals are shortened as a result of 
the increased disclosure frequency, some firms are likely to have projects whose cumulative cash 
payoffs are not complete within the shortened reporting interval. For instance, if a firm’s average 
length of cash payoffs from all projects is 120 days, most of its projects are complete by semi-
annual end, but are incomplete at quarter end. The increased incentive to be myopic is especially 
salient for firms whose average length of cash payoffs from all projects is shorter than the old 
reporting interval but longer than the new reporting interval because those firms view the old 
reporting regime as infrequent, but view the new reporting regime as frequent. As disclosure 
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frequency induced myopia is more (less) likely to be present under frequent (infrequent) 
reporting scenario, the shift from infrequent to frequent reporting regime creates a new incentive 
for managers in those firms to be myopic. Accordingly, we hypothesize that an increase in the 
frequency of mandatory reporting deters (encourages) more firms from entering (to exit) the 
public markets to avoid disclosure frequency induced myopia, especially in industries whose 
average length of cash payoffs from all projects is shorter than the old reporting interval but 
longer than the new reporting interval. This leads to the fourth hypothesis: 
H4: An increase in the frequency of mandatory reporting deters (encourages) more firms from 
entering (to exit) the public markets to avoid disclosure frequency induced myopia, especially in 
industries whose cash conversion cycles are shorter than the old reporting interval but longer 
than the new reporting interval.  
 
III. Research design and sample selection   
3.1. Managerial myopia, investor impatience, and the length of the cash conversion cycle 
According to Gigler et al. [2014], disclosure frequency induced myopia is more likely to 
be present when mandatory disclosure is frequent and investors are impatient. To validate 
whether the cash conversion cycle is a good proxy for the average length of payoffs from all 
projects, we compare managerial myopia in the year of seasoned equity offerings in U.S. public 
firms partitioned by the length of the cash conversion cycle, controlling for investor impatience.  
We measure managerial myopia using real activity management via manipulating 
research and development expenses. Following Roychowdhury [2006], Cohen and Zarowin 
[2010] and Zang [2012], we compute abnormal research and development (ARND) expenses as 
the residual from the following regression: 
𝑅𝑁𝐷𝑡
𝐴𝑆𝑆𝐸𝑇𝑆𝑡−1
=  𝛼0 + 𝛼1
1
𝐴𝑆𝑆𝐸𝑇𝑆𝑡−1
+ 𝛼2
𝑆𝐴𝐿𝐸𝑆𝑡−1
𝐴𝑆𝑆𝐸𝑇𝑆𝑡−1
+ 𝜀𝑡 
 (1) 
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where RNDt is research and development expense in year t. SALESt-1 and ASSETSt-1 are sales 
and total assets in year t-1. The regression is estimated cross-sectionally by industry and year for 
the period from 1987 to 2015. We require that there be at least eight observations for every 
industry and year combination. We use the North American Industry Classification System 
(NAICS) to classify industries because Bhojraj et al. [2003] suggest that the NAICS yields 
groupings of firms that are more economically related and homogeneous than the Standard 
Industry Classification (SIC) system.2 Firms in finance industries (those for which the first two 
digits of the NAICS codes are 52 and 53) are excluded because their cash conversion cycle is not 
well defined.  
We compute the length of the cash conversion cycle as the sum of days’ sales outstanding 
in accounts receivables plus days’ sales in inventory minus days’ sales in accounts payable. 
Days’ sales outstanding in accounts receivables measures the amount of time it takes to collect 
cash from customers and is calculated as accounts receivable divided by daily sales. Days’ sales 
in inventory measures the amount of time each net input dollar is tied up in the production 
process and inventory and is calculated as inventory divided by daily cost of goods sold. Days’ 
sales in accounts payable measures the days of operation that are financed by suppliers, that is, 
the number of days before suppliers are paid, and is calculated as accounts payable divided by 
daily cost of goods sold. The cash conversion cycle increases with days’ sales in inventory and 
days’ sales outstanding in accounts receivables and decreases with days’ sales in accounts 
                                                 
2 The NAICS uses a six-digit hierarchical coding scheme to classify all product markets into 20 sectors, 5 of which 
are goods-producing sectors and 15 of which are services-providing sectors. The NAICS was developed in response 
to structural changes in the economy. Recent developments in information services, new forms of healthcare 
provision, expansion of services, and high-tech manufacturing are examples of the structural changes that cannot be 
studied under the SIC system. Nine new service sectors and 250 new service industries are recognized under the 
NAICS. The empirical results are robust using SIC codes to classify industries.  
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payable. We use the median cash conversion cycle over the previous five years as a proxy for the 
normal level of cash conversion cycle for each firm-year.  
Ernstberger et al. [2017] argue that a capital market is more impatient when investors put 
a stronger emphasis on earlier rather than later future cash flows. Ernstberger et al. [2017] 
measure investor impatience as the ratio of the return-sensitivity for current year’s cash flows 
relative to the return-sensitivity for subsequent year’s cash flows. Because we examine the 
effects of mandatory disclosure on managerial myopia and the mandatory disclosure frequency 
in the United States is quarterly, we measure investor impatience as the ratio of the return-
sensitivity for current quarter’s cash flow relative to the return-sensitivity for subsequent 
quarter’s cash flows. Specifically, we estimate the following regression for each firm-year using 
five years of data: 
𝑅𝐸𝑇𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1
𝐶𝐹𝑂𝑞1
𝐴𝑆𝑆𝐸𝑇𝑆𝑡−1
+ 𝛽2
𝐶𝐹𝑂𝑞2−𝑞4
𝐴𝑆𝑆𝐸𝑇𝑆𝑡−1
+ 𝛽3
𝐶𝐹𝑂𝑡+1
𝐴𝑆𝑆𝐸𝑇𝑆𝑡−1
+ 𝜇𝑡 
 (2) 
where RETt is the buy-hold return over the 12-month period starting four months after the end of 
fiscal year t-1; and CFOq1, CFOq2-q4, and CFOt+1 are standardized cash flows from operations of 
the first quarter of year t, the second quarter to the fourth quarter of year t, and year t+1, 
respectively. Investor impatience (IMPATIENCE) equals one if the ratio abs(β1)/(abs(β2) + 
abs(β3)) is above the industry median, and zero otherwise.3  
We obtain the seasoned equity offerings sample from the Thomson Reuters SDC New 
Issue database for the period from 1987 to 2015. The sample is restricted to firms listed on the 
New York Stock Exchange, the American Stock Exchange and NASDAQ and excludes initial 
public offerings, private placements, rights issues, spin-offs, and unit issues. The final sample 
                                                 
3 We use two alternative ratios, abs(β1)/abs(β2) and abs(β1)/abs(β3), to define investor impatience and obtain similar 
results.  
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with sufficient data to compute ARND, cash conversion cycle, and investor impatience includes 
369 observations.  
 
3.2. The length of the cash conversion cycle and the proportion of public firms 
Hypothesis 2 examines whether the incentive to stay private to avoid disclosure 
frequency induced myopia triggers a downward kink in the relation between the length of cash 
conversion cycle and the likelihood of being public around the time frame that corresponds to the 
mandatory reporting interval. In the United States, the mandatory reporting frequency has been 
quarterly since 1970. To test Hypothesis 2, we collect the total number of firms, both private and 
public, in a given industry from the Census of Manufactures4 and the information about public 
firms from Compustat for the sample period from 1995 to 2014.  
The U.S. census takes place every five years. The latest Census of Manufactures used in 
the sample was published in 2012. To align the census year with the fiscal year, we use the 
census data from a given year not only for that year, but also for the two years immediately 
before and after it. For instance, the number of all firms (NUM_FIRMS_CENSUS) from the 
2012 census is aligned with the number of public firms (NUM_PUBLIC) from Compustat for 
each industry-year observation from 2010 to 2014. Accordingly, for each industry, 
NUM_FIRMS_CENSUS is identical from 2010 to 2014. Therefore, it is necessary to cluster-
adjust standard errors in the associated empirical analyses. The industry-level proportion of 
public firms (PROPORTIONit) is the fraction of the number of public firms (NUM_PUBLICit) 
relative to the total number of firms (NUM_FIRMS_CENSUSit) for a given industry-year. As the 
                                                 
4According to the Census of Manufactures, a firm is defined as an aggregation of all establishments that operate 
under the ownership or control of a single organization. A firm includes all subsidiary organizations, all 
establishments that are majority-owned by the company or any subsidiary, and all the establishments that can be 
directed or managed by the company or any subsidiary. A nonpublic firm is defined as privately owned by 
individuals rather than by a subsidiary of other companies in the Census. Therefore, the number of all firms in an 
industry is equal to the number of privately held firms plus the number of public firms. 
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proportional-type variable typically does not satisfy the statistical properties of the ordinary least 
squares (OLS) estimation, following Draper and Smith [1966], we perform log odds 
transformation of PROPORTIONit. The dependent variable is the log odds (LOG_ODDSit), 
which is measured as Ln[PROPORTIONit / (1-PROPORTIONit)].  
As the cash conversion cycle of private firms is not measurable due to the lack of 
available data, we use the median length of the cash conversion cycle of public firms in 
Compustat in a given industry-year as a proxy for the length of the industry’s cash conversion 
cycle (INDUSTRY_CCC). CCC_LONG1Q is an indicator variable that equals one if 
INDUSTRY_CCC is longer than one quarter, and zero otherwise. We also measure the three 
components of cash conversion cycle at the industry level. INDUSTRY_DSO, INDUSTRY_DSI, 
and INDUSTRY_DPO are the median days’ sales outstanding in accounts receivable, the median 
days’ sales in inventory, and the median days’ sales in accounts payable, respectively, of public 
firms in a given industry-year.  
We include a set of control variables. Ali et al. [2009] suggest that, in industries with 
fewer firms, the percentage of large public firms is higher; these firms are more likely to be 
included on Compustat. Therefore, it is essential to hold the number of firms constant when 
examining the empirical relationship between the length of the cash conversion cycle and the 
proportion of public firms across industries. Accordingly, we include the number of firms 
measured in thousands in a given industry (NUM_FIRMS_CENSUSit). We also include the 
logarithm of the average sales of public firms in a given industry (Ln[INDUSTRY_SALESit]) to 
control for the differences in size across industries.  
Proprietary costs of mandatory disclosure could vary across industries and over time. To 
the extent that firms in more profitable industries face greater proprietary costs of public 
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disclosure, we include industry-level profitability to capture the cross-industry variation in 
proprietary costs. We measure industry-level profitability using the average gross profit margin 
(INDUSTRY_GPM) of public firms in Compustat in a given industry-year.5 Proprietary costs of 
mandatory disclosure could vary considerably over time. Survey evidence indicates that segment 
information is viewed as the most competitively sensitive information. In 1997, the Financial 
Accounting Standards Board issued Statement of Financial Accounting Standards (SFAS) 131, 
which requires that public firms use the management approach instead of the industry approach 
to classify business segments. Under the management approach, segment information is 
presented based on how management internally evaluates the operating performance of its 
business units. SFAS 131 increases the number of reported segments and provides more 
disaggregated information (see Berger and Hann [2003]). Moreover, SFAS 131 allows investors 
to assess the performance of individual operating segments in the same way as management. We 
include POST_SFAS131t to capture the potential increase in proprietary costs of mandatory 
disclosure after SFAS 131. POST_SFAS131t is an indicator variable, which equals one if the 
year is 1997 or later, and zero otherwise.   
Implementation costs of mandatory disclosure could vary over time. To the extent that 
the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (SOX) significantly increases the implementation costs of 
mandatory disclosure requirements (see Engel, Hayes and Wang [2007]), we include 
POST_SOXt to capture the temporal change in implementation costs. POST_SOXt is an 
indicator variable, which equals one if the year is 2002 or later, and zero otherwise. In summary, 
the specification to test Hypothesis 2 is as follow: 
                                                 
5 We also use price-to-cost margin (INDUSTRY_MARKUP) as an alternative proxy for industry-level profitability 
and obtain similar results. Following Allayannis and Ihrig [2001], INDUSTRY_MARKUPit is defined as (value of 
shipments + ∆inventory-payroll-cost of materials)/(value of shipments + ∆inventory). The required data are 
collected from Annual Survey of Manufacturers publications.  
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𝐿𝑂𝐺_𝑂𝐷𝐷𝑆𝑖𝑡 = ∝ + 𝛽1𝐼𝑁𝐷𝑈𝑆𝑇𝑅𝑌_𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2𝐶𝐶𝐶_𝐿𝑂𝑁𝐺1𝑄𝑖𝑡 + 𝜷𝟑𝑪𝑪𝑪_𝑳𝑶𝑵𝑮𝟏𝑸𝒊𝒕 ∗ 𝑰𝑵𝑫𝑼𝑺𝑻𝑹𝒀_𝑪𝑪𝑪𝒊𝒕  
+ 𝛽4𝑁𝑈𝑀_𝐹𝐼𝑅𝑀𝑆_𝐶𝐸𝑁𝑆𝑈𝑆𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽5𝐿𝑛(𝐼𝑁𝐷𝑈𝑆𝑇𝑅𝑌_𝑆𝐴𝐿𝐸𝑆)𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽6𝐼𝑁𝐷𝑈𝑆𝑇𝑅𝑌_𝐺𝑃𝑀𝑖𝑡  
+  𝛽7𝑃𝑂𝑆𝑇_𝑆𝐹𝐴𝑆131𝑡 +  𝛽8𝑃𝑂𝑆𝑇_𝑆𝑂𝑋𝑡 + 𝜺𝒊𝒕 
  (3)  
The variable of interest is the coefficient on the interaction term between INDUSTRY_CCC and 
CCC_LONG1Q. We expect β3 to be negative. The sample for the empirical tests of Hypothesis 2 
includes the 5,842 industry-year observations from 401 manufacturing industries between 1995 
and 2014. 
Regression (4) summarizes the specification that explores the effects of the three 
components of the industry’s cash conversion cycle on the proportion of public firms: 
𝐿𝑂𝐺_𝑂𝐷𝐷𝑆𝑖𝑡 = ∝ + 𝛽1𝐶𝐶𝐶_𝐿𝑂𝑁𝐺1𝑄𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2𝐼𝑁𝐷𝑈𝑆𝑇𝑅𝑌_𝐷𝑆𝐼𝑖𝑡 + 𝜷𝟑𝑪𝑪𝑪_𝑳𝑶𝑵𝑮𝟏𝑸𝒊𝒕 ∗ 𝑰𝑵𝑫𝑼𝑺𝑻𝑹𝒀_𝑫𝑺𝑰𝒊𝒕
+ 𝛽4𝐼𝑁𝐷𝑈𝑆𝑇𝑅𝑌_𝐷𝑆𝑂𝑖𝑡 + 𝜷𝟓𝑪𝑪𝑪_𝑳𝑶𝑵𝑮𝟏𝑸𝒊𝒕 ∗ 𝑰𝑵𝑫𝑼𝑺𝑻𝑹𝒀_𝑫𝑺𝑶𝒊𝒕 + 𝛽6𝐼𝑁𝐷𝑈𝑆𝑇𝑅𝑌_𝐷𝑃𝑂𝑖𝑡
+ 𝜷𝟕𝑪𝑪𝑪_𝑳𝑶𝑵𝑮𝟏𝑸𝒊𝒕 ∗ 𝑰𝑵𝑫𝑼𝑺𝑻𝑹𝒀_𝑫𝑷𝑶𝒊𝒕 + 𝛽8𝑁𝑈𝑀_𝐹𝐼𝑅𝑀𝑆_𝐶𝐸𝑁𝑆𝑈𝑆𝑖𝑡
+ 𝛽9𝐿𝑛(𝐼𝑁𝐷𝑈𝑆𝑇𝑅𝑌_𝑆𝐴𝐿𝐸𝑆)𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽10𝐼𝑁𝐷𝑈𝑆𝑇𝑅𝑌_𝐺𝑃𝑀𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽11𝑃𝑂𝑆𝑇_𝑆𝐹𝐴𝑆131𝑡
+ 𝛽12𝑃𝑂𝑆𝑇_𝑆𝑂𝑋𝑡 + 𝜺𝒊𝒕 
  ( 4 ) 
The variables of interest are the coefficients on the three interaction terms. We expect β3 and β5 
to be negative and β7 to be positive.  
 
3.3. Length of cash conversion cycle and the choice of listing exchanges 
Hypothesis 3 examines the relation between the length of cash conversion cycle and the 
firm’s choice of listing exchange when it goes public. Prior to the implementation in the U.K. of 
the European Union Transparency Directive in 2007, U.K. public firms were required to file only 
semi-annual and annual reports. However, if a U.K.–domiciled firm chose to list on U.S. stock 
exchanges, it would be subject to quarterly reporting. To test Hypothesis 3, we employ the 
Worldscope annual database to identify U.K.–domiciled firms that were listed on the U.K. or 
U.S. stock exchanges from 2002 to 2006, the four-year period prior to the change in mandatory 
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reporting frequency in the U.K.6  We define the indicator variable for U.K.–domiciled firms 
listed in the United States (USLIST), which equals one for U.K. firms listed in the U.S. markets, 
and zero for U.K. firms listed in the U.K. markets. To capture difference between a firm’s cash 
conversion cycle and that of its industry peers, we compute the industry-adjusted cash 
conversion cycle in two alternative ways. CCC_DM1 (2) is a firm’s cash conversion cycle minus 
industry average cash conversion cycle, where industry average cash conversion cycle is 
computed every year using the U.K. firms listed in the U.K. (both U.S. and U.K.) markets. 
Industries are defined at the two-digit industry group level in Worldscope (Item 6011). Financial 
industries (Item 6011 between 4310 and 4395) are excluded. To control for the differences in 
listing requirements between U.S. and U.K. exchanges, we include the logarithm of SALES 
(Item 7240) and return on assets (ROA)—operating income (Item 1250) divided by total assets 
(Item 2999)—as control variables. The sample to test Hypothesis 3 includes 8,120 firm-year 
observations from 2002 to 2006 and regression (5) summarizes the specification: 
𝑈𝑆𝐿𝐼𝑆𝑇𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝜷𝟏𝑪𝑪𝑪𝒊𝒕 + 𝛽2𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽3𝐿𝑛(𝑆𝐴𝐿𝐸𝑆)𝑖𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡 
𝑈𝑆𝐿𝐼𝑆𝑇𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝜷𝟏𝑪𝑪𝑪_𝑫𝑴𝟏𝒊𝒕 + 𝛽2𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽3𝐿𝑛(𝑆𝐴𝐿𝐸𝑆)𝑖𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡 
𝑈𝑆𝐿𝐼𝑆𝑇𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝜷𝟏𝑪𝑪𝑪_𝑫𝑴𝟐𝒊𝒕 + 𝛽2𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽3𝐿𝑛(𝑆𝐴𝐿𝐸𝑆)𝑖𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡 
 (5) 
The variable of interest is the coefficient on the raw/industry adjusted cash conversion cycle. We 
expect β1 to be negative.  
 
3.4. Changes in disclosure frequency and changes in the proportion of public firms 
  
Hypothesis 4 examines the effects of an increase in mandatory disclosure frequency on 
firms’ likelihood to be public. We take advantage of two natural experiments in the changes of 
the mandatory disclosure frequency from semi-annual to quarterly in 1970 for U.S. firms and 
2007 for U.K. firms.  
                                                 
6 The sample starts in 2002 to minimize the potential confounding effects of SOX on the implementation costs of 
mandatory disclosure requirements (see Engel, Hayes and Wang [2007]).  
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3.4.1 The U.S. sample of change in mandatory reporting frequency 
For the U.S. sample, we manually collect the number of all firms 
(NUM_FIRMS_CENSUS) in each industry from the 1967 and 1972 Census of Manufactures.7 
To align the census year with the fiscal year, we use the census data from a given year not only 
for that year but also for the two years immediately before and after it. For instance, the data 
from the 1967 census are assigned to 1965 to 1969 and are aligned with public firms’ data from 
Compustat.  
Because NAICS was not available in these early censuses, we use the SIC system to 
classify industries. SIC went through major revisions in 1972 and 1987. The SIC codes in 
Compustat are published by the United States Office of Management and Budget in their 1987 
edition of the SIC Manual. To ensure the industry classifications are consistent over time and 
across different data sources, we manually collect the composition of 1972 SIC industries based 
on 1967 SIC codes from table 1C of the industry group reports from the 1972 Census of 
Manufactures. Using this information, we create a 1967 SIC to 1972 SIC concordance table, that 
is, the percentage of 1967 SIC industries mapped into 1972 SIC definitions. The percentage is 
calculated as 1972 value of shipments for 1972 SIC definitions divided by total 1972 value of 
shipments for 1967 SIC definitions. A percentage of “100” indicates that a 1967 SIC code is 
entirely mapped into a 1972 SIC code, which also includes several 1967 SIC codes combined to 
form a new 1972 SIC code. A percentage less than “100” indicates that a 1967 SIC code is split 
into several 1972 SIC codes, which we exclude from the sample to ensure a reliable map from 
the old definitions to the new definitions. We obtain a similar 1972 SIC to 1987 SIC 
                                                 
7 Bureau of the Census, 1967 Census of Manufactures, https://archive.org/details/1967censusofmanu21unse; Bureau 
of the Census, 1972 Census of Manufactures, https://archive.org/details/1972censusofmanu21unse.  
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concordance table from the NBER-CES Manufacturing Industry Database.8 We then use these 
two concordance tables to map the data from the 1967 and 1972 Census of Manufactures into the 
1987 SIC definitions. The process results in a sample of 880 industry-year observations from 97 
manufacturing industries for the period from 1965 to 1974. 
We use the median length of the cash conversion cycle of public firms in a particular 
industry (INDUSTRY_CCC) measured between 1965 and 1969 to capture the normal industry-
level cash conversion cycle before the change of mandatory reporting frequency. CCC_1Q2Qi is 
an indicator variable, which equals one if INDUSTRY_CCC measured between 1965 and 1969 
is longer than one quarter and shorter than two quarters, and zero otherwise. To capture the 
change of mandatory reporting frequency from semi-annual to quarterly, we use an indicator 
variable USQTRt, which equals one if the year is between 1970 and 1974, and zero if the year is 
between 1965 and 1969. Regression (6) summarizes the specification to test Hypothesis 4 using 
the U.S. sample: 
𝐿𝑂𝐺_𝑂𝐷𝐷𝑆𝑖𝑡 = ∝ + 𝛽1𝐼𝑁𝐷𝑈𝑆𝑇𝑅𝑌_𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑈𝑆𝑄𝑇𝑅𝑡 + 𝛽3𝐶𝐶𝐶_1𝑄2𝑄𝑖 +  𝜷𝟒𝑪𝑪𝑪_𝟏𝑸𝟐𝑸𝒊 ∗ 𝑼𝑺𝑸𝑻𝑹𝒕  
+ 𝛽5𝑁𝑈𝑀_𝐹𝐼𝑅𝑀𝑆_𝐶𝐸𝑁𝑆𝑈𝑆𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽6𝐿𝑛(𝐼𝑁𝐷𝑈𝑆𝑇𝑅𝑌_𝑆𝐴𝐿𝐸𝑆)𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽7𝐼𝑁𝐷𝑈𝑆𝑇𝑅𝑌_𝐺𝑃𝑀𝑖𝑡 +  +𝜺𝒊𝒕 
 (6) 
The variable of interest is the coefficient on the interaction term between USQTR and 
CCC_1Q2Q, which captures the comparison between the change in the proportion of public 
firms in industries whose cash conversion cycles are longer than one quarter but shorter than two 
quarters and the corresponding change in the remaining industries, that is, a difference-in-
differences comparison. We expect β4 to be negative. 
 
3.4.2 The U.K. sample of change in mandatory reporting frequency 
For the U.K. sample, we use a difference-in-differences research design to examine 
whether the distribution of public firms from a particular industry in the U.K. changed in 
                                                 
8 National Bureau of Economic Research, http://www.nber.org/nberces/.  
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response to the change in the frequency of mandatory reporting. In particular, we compare the 
industry composition of all public firms in the U.K. during the period from 2007 to 2011, when 
the frequency of mandatory reporting was quarterly, to that during the period from 2002 to 2006, 
when the frequency of mandatory reporting was semi-annual.9 To mitigate the concern that other 
concurrent factors influence a firm’s decision to enter or exit a particular industry, we use the 
industry composition of all public firms in the United States as the benchmark. The United States 
is an appropriate benchmark because the frequency of mandatory reporting is quarterly during 
the corresponding periods.  
We use the Worldscope annual database to obtain financial data for public firms in the 
U.K. and the United States and Worldscope industry groups (Item 6011) to classify industries to 
ensure consistent classification between the U.K. and U.S. firms. Financial industries (Item 6011 
between 4310 and 4395) are excluded from the sample. To capture the normal industry-level 
cash conversion cycle for U.K. firms prior to the change of mandatory reporting frequency, we 
compute the industry median cash conversion cycle of U.K. public firms during the period from 
2002 to 2006. The indicator variables, CCC_1Q, CCC_1Q2Q, and CCC_2Q, equal one if a firm 
belongs to industries whose median cash conversion cycle measured over the period from 2002 
to 2006 is less than one quarter, between one quarter and two quarters, or more than two quarters, 
respectively, and zero otherwise. We use public firms in the United States as the benchmark and 
assign the U.S. firms to the above-defined three groups based on their industry membership. The 
indicator variable for the change in mandatory disclosure frequency, UKQTR, equals one for 
observations between 2007 and 2011, and zero for observations between 2002 and 2006.   
                                                 
9 Because we use U.S. firms as the control group and SOX was enacted in 2002, we start the sample from 2002 to 
minimize the potential confounding effects of SOX on the implementation costs of mandatory disclosure 
requirements (see Engel, Hayes and Wang [2007]). The sample ends in 2011 so that there are five years in both the 
pre- and the post-event periods.  
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We include control variables similar to those in the previous tests: industry gross profit 
margin (INDUSTRY_GPM), which is the industry average gross profit margin [(Item 1001 – 
Item 1051)/Item 1001], and industry sales [Ln(INDUSTRY_SALES)], which is the logarithm of 
the average sales (Item 7240) of public firms in a particular industry. The U.K. sample to test 
Hypotheses 4 includes 17,217 firm-year observations in the U.K. and 80,922 firm-year 
observations in the United States between 2002 and 2011. Regression (7) summarizes the 
specification to test Hypothesis 4 using the U.K. sample: 
𝐶𝐶𝐶_1𝑄𝑖 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝑈𝐾𝑖 + 𝛽2𝑈𝐾𝑄𝑇𝑅𝑡 + 𝜷𝟑𝑼𝑲𝒊 ∗ 𝑼𝑲𝑸𝑻𝑹𝒕 + 𝛽4𝐼𝑁𝐷𝑈𝑆𝑇𝑅𝑌_𝐺𝑃𝑀𝑖𝑡
+ 𝛽5𝐿𝑛(𝐼𝑁𝐷𝑈𝑆𝑇𝑅𝑌_𝑆𝐴𝐿𝐸𝑆)𝑖𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡 
𝐶𝐶𝐶_1𝑄2𝑄𝑖 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝑈𝐾𝑖 + 𝛽2𝑈𝐾𝑄𝑇𝑅𝑡 + 𝜷𝟑𝑼𝑲𝒊 ∗ 𝑼𝑲𝑸𝑻𝑹𝒕 + 𝛽4𝐼𝑁𝐷𝑈𝑆𝑇𝑅𝑌_𝐺𝑃𝑀𝑖𝑡
+ 𝛽5𝐿𝑛(𝐼𝑁𝐷𝑈𝑆𝑇𝑅𝑌_𝑆𝐴𝐿𝐸𝑆)𝑖𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡 
𝐶𝐶𝐶_2𝑄𝑖 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝑈𝐾𝑖 + 𝛽2𝑈𝐾𝑄𝑇𝑅𝑡 + 𝜷𝟑𝑼𝑲𝒊 ∗ 𝑼𝑲𝑸𝑻𝑹𝒕 + 𝛽4𝐼𝑁𝐷𝑈𝑆𝑇𝑅𝑌_𝐺𝑃𝑀𝑖𝑡
+ 𝛽5𝐿𝑛(𝐼𝑁𝐷𝑈𝑆𝑇𝑅𝑌_𝑆𝐴𝐿𝐸𝑆)𝑖𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡 
 (7) 
The variable of interest is the coefficient on the interaction term between UKQTR and UK, the 
indicator variable for U.K. firms. The coefficient captures the comparison between the changes 
in the distributions of public firms in each of the three groups formed based on the length of 
industry cash conversion cycles in the U.K. with the corresponding changes in the United States, 
that is, a difference-in-differences comparison. We expect β3 to be negative when the dependent 
variable is CCC_1Q2Q. 
 
IV. Empirical results 
4.1. Results for test of Hypothesis 1 
Table 1 reports the mean and median abnormal research and development expenses 
(ARND) in firm-year observations in the year of seasoned equity offerings (SEOs) partitioned by 
cash conversion cycle and investor impatience (IMPATIENCE). Lower ARND indicates that the 
firm cuts research and development expenses in the year of SEOs, indicative of higher 
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managerial myopia. As the first row of results shows, the mean and median ARND are -0.031 
and -0.034, respectively, for firms with cash conversion cycles longer than one quarter, and 
0.006 and -0.003, respectively, for firms with cash conversion cycles shorter than one quarter. 
The differences between the two groups are statistically significant (t = -2.79 and z = -2.37). The 
evidence suggests that compared to firms with cash conversion cycles shorter than one quarter, 
firms with cash conversion cycles longer than one quarter cut more research and development 
expenses in the year of SEOs. The evidence supports Hypothesis 1a.  
The next two rows of results in table 1 report the mean and median ARND in groups 
partitioned by investor impatience (IMPATIENCE). For firms with high investor impatience 
(IMPATIENCE = 1) and cash conversion cycles longer than one quarter, the mean and median 
ARND in the year of SEOs are -0.048 and -0.045, respectively. The corresponding numbers are 
0.004 and -0.003, respectively, for firms with high investor impatience and cash conversion 
cycles shorter than one quarter. The differences between the two groups are statistically 
significant (t = -2.67 and z = -2.37). In contrast, the two groups of firms with low investor 
impatience (IMPATIENCE = 0) show no significant differences in ARND in the year of SEOs. 
Specifically, the mean and median ARND are -0.012 and -0.010, respectively, for firms with 
cash conversion cycles longer than one quarter, and 0.008 and 0.005, respectively, for firms with 
cash conversion cycles shorter than one quarter. The t-statistic and z-statistic for differences in 
mean and median between the two groups are -1.10 and -0.84, respectively. Finally, the last row 
of table 1 shows that the differences in ARND in the year of SEOs between firms with high 
investor impatience and firms with low investor impatience are statistically significant only when 
these firms’ cash conversion cycles are longer than one quarter. These results support Hypothesis 
1b and indicate that the difference in managerial myopia between firms whose cash conversion 
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cycles are longer than one quarter and firms whose cash conversion cycles are shorter than one 
quarter is more pronounced when investors are impatient.  
Overall, the results in table 1 are consistent with the predictions in Gigler et al. [2014] 
that, in response to price pressure from the public market, disclosure frequency induced myopia 
is present only under the scenario of frequent reporting (that is, when the average length of cash 
payoffs from all projects is longer than the mandatory reporting frequency), and that disclosure 
frequency induced myopia increases as price pressure from the public market increases. These 
results validate the use of the cash conversion cycle as an empirical proxy for the average length 
of cash payoffs from all projects. 
 
4.2. Results for tests of Hypothesis 2 
Panel A of table 2 provides descriptive statistics on the 5,842 industry-year observations 
in the sample for testing Hypothesis 2. On average, 2.654% of firms in an industry are public 
firms. The average length of the cash conversion cycle is 100.99 days and the median length of 
the cash conversion cycle is 89.38 days, with one industry having a cash conversion cycle as 
short as 0.5 days and another having a cash conversion cycle as long as 4,070.63 days. The 
average number of firms in an industry, according to the Census of Manufactures, is about 733 
firms, with one industry having only 8 firms and another having as many as 22,180. The average 
industry-level gross profit margin is 8%, whereas the median industry-level gross profit margin 
is 29%. The average industry-level revenue is $1,835.48 million and median industry-level sales 
are $547.20 million.  
Panel B of table 2 provides the correlation table. On the univariate basis, the Pearson and 
Spearman correlations between the length of cash conversion cycle (INDUSTRY_CCC) and the 
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log odds of public firms (LOG_ODDS) are 0.033 and 0.062, respectively, and both are 
statistically significant at the 1% level. This is consistent with the notion that a longer cash 
conversion cycle is associated with a greater need to raise capital externally. The Pearson and 
Spearman correlations between LOG_ODDS and the number of firms in a given industry 
(NUM_FIRMS_CENSUS) are -0.496 and -0.596, respectively, both of which are statistically 
significant at the 1% level. This is consistent with the finding in Ali et al. [2009] that, in 
industries with fewer firms, there is a greater percentage of large public firms; these firms are 
more likely to be included in Compustat.  
Table 3 presents the results of Regression (3). In the first column, we include only the 
length of the cash conversion cycle and the number of firms as independent variables to explain 
the variation in the proportion of public firms across different industries. The two variables 
combined are able to explain 24.68% of variation in the proportion of public firms across 
different industries. The slope coefficient on NUM_FIRMS_CENSUS is -0.458 and statistically 
significant (t = -6.38), consistent with prior findings that industries with fewer firms have a 
greater percentage of large public firms. The slope coefficient on INDUSTRY_CCC is 
statistically insignificant, suggesting no relation between the length of cash conversion cycles 
and the proportion of public firms when all lengths of cash conversion cycle are considered.     
In the second column of table 3, four control variables, including industry profitability 
(INDUSTRY_GPM), the logarithm of the industry average sales (Ln[INDUSTRY_SALES]), the 
indicator variable for the post-SFAS 131 regime (POST_SFAS131), and the indicator variable 
for the post-SOX regime (POST_SOX) are included to explain the variation in the proportion of 
public firms across industries. With the control variables, the explanatory power of the 
regression increases from 24.68% to 35.76%. The slope coefficient on INDUSTRY_CCC is now 
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positive and statistically significant (t = 3.13). Consistent with the expectation that firms in more 
profitable industries face greater proprietary costs of public disclosure, and thus have a greater 
incentive to avoid the commitment to mandatory disclosure, the slope coefficient on 
INDUSTRY_GPM is negative and statistically significant (t = -4.89). The slope coefficient on 
Ln[INDUSTRY_SALES] is positive and statistically significant (t = 5.86), consistent with the 
bias that larger firms are more likely to be included in Compustat (see Ali et al. [2009]). The 
third column of table 3 adds one more independent variable, CCC_LONG1Q, the indicator for 
INDUSTRY_CCC longer than one quarter. The slope coefficient on CCC_LONG1Q is positive 
and statistically significant (t = 1.97), suggesting that firms in industries whose cash conversion 
cycles are longer than one quarter, on average, have a greater need for equity from the public 
market than firms in industries whose cash conversion cycles are shorter than one quarter.  
Finally, the last column of table 3 presents the results on whether the association between 
the length of cash conversion cycles and the proportion of public firms is weakened in industries 
whose cash conversion cycles are longer than the frequency of mandatory reporting. The slope 
coefficient on the interaction term between INDUSTRY_CCC and CCC_LONG1Q is -0.005 and 
statistically significant (t = -2.48). The result indicates that, when the industry cash conversion 
cycle is longer than one quarter, the extra incentive to stay private to avoid disclosure frequency 
induced myopia triggers a downward kink in the relation between the proportion of public firms 
in that industry and the length of cash conversion cycle. The magnitude of the slope coefficients 
on INDUSTRY_CCC and CCC_LONG1Q*INDUSTRY_CCC implies that, when cash 
conversion cycles are shorter than one quarter, a one-day increase in the length of the cash 
conversion cycle is associated with a 0.6% increase in the odds of being a public firm, which is 
equivalent to a 0.016% increase in the proportion of public firms from the mean. In contrast, 
 29 
when cash conversion cycles are longer than one quarter, a one-day increase in the length of the 
cash conversion cycle is associated with only a 0.1% increase in the odds of being a public firm, 
which translates to a 0.003% increase in the proportion of public firms from the mean. In other 
words, a one-day increase in the cash conversion cycle in industries whose cash conversion 
cycles are longer than one quarter is associated with an additional 0.013% (0.016% − 0.003%) 
decrease in the proportion of public firms from the mean, compared to the corresponding change 
in industries whose cash conversion cycles are shorter than one quarter. The evidence is 
consistent with the interpretation that disclosure frequency induced myopia is more pronounced 
when the industry’s cash conversion cycle exceeds the frequency of mandatory reporting in the 
United States. 
 Table 4 presents results of Regression (4). In the first column, the slope coefficient on 
CCC_LONG1Q*INDUSTRY_DSI is -0.007 and statistically significant (t = -3.58). In the next 
two columns, the slope coefficients on CCC_LONG1Q*INDUSTRY_DSO and 
CCC_LONG1Q*INDUSTRY_DPO are 0.001 and -0.002, respectively, both of which are 
statistically insignificant. In the last column, when the three components of the cash conversion 
cycle are included simultaneously as explanatory variables, the slope coefficient on 
CCC_LONG1Q*INDUSTRY_DSI is -0.007 and statistically significant (t = -2.01), and the 
coefficients on CCC_LONG1Q*INDUSTRY_DPO and CCC_LONG1Q*INDUSTRY_DSO 
remain statistically insignificant.  
 To summarize, the results in this section are consistent with the interpretation that 
disclosure frequency induced myopia is more pronounced when the length of the cash 
conversion cycle exceeds the frequency of mandatory reporting, which deters more firms in 
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those industries from entering the public market and thereby provides strong support for 
Hypothesis 2.  
 
4.3 Results for tests of Hypothesis 3 
Panel A of table 5 reports the mean and median of the variables in the test of Hypothesis 
3. The average cash conversion cycle is −22.79 days for the full sample of 8,120 firm-year 
observations from 2002 to 2006. In the subsample of 574 firm-year observations of U.K. 
domiciled firms that were listed on the U.S. exchanges, the average cash conversion cycle is 
−57.66 days, suggesting that these firms rely heavily on suppliers to finance their operations. The 
average industry-adjusted cash conversion cycle (CCC_DM1 and CCC_DM2) is negative for the 
subsample of firms domiciled in the U.K. but listed in the United States, suggesting that these 
firms have shorter cash conversion cycles than their industry peers. The last two columns show 
that U.S.–listed U.K. firms have comparable ROA but are much bigger than their counterparts 
listed on the U.K. stock exchanges. 
Panel B of table 5 reports the results of Regression (5). The coefficient on cash 
conversion cycle is -0.038 and statistically significant (Chi-square = 36.31), suggesting that U.K. 
firms with longer cash conversion cycles are less likely to list on U.S. stock exchanges, where 
quarterly reporting is required. The coefficients on CCC_DM1 and CCC_DM2 are both -0.029 
and statistically significant, indicating that U.K. firms with cash conversion cycles longer than 
those of their industry peers are less likely to list on U.S. stock exchanges. In other words, these 
firms are more likely to list on U.K. exchanges that require less frequent mandatory disclosure to 
mitigate disclosure frequency induced myopia. The evidence supports Hypothesis 3.  
 
 31 
4.4. Results for tests of Hypothesis 4 
4.4.1 The U.S. sample 
Table 6 reports results of Regression (6). Focusing on the full-model results in the last 
column, we observe that the slope coefficient on the interaction term between CCC_1Q2Q and 
USQTR is −0.293 and statistically significant (t = -2.36). The evidence suggests that the 
proportion of public firms in industries whose cash conversion cycles are longer than one quarter 
and shorter than two quarters decreased significantly after the mandatory reporting frequency 
changed from semi-annual to quarterly in the United States. The magnitude of the slope 
coefficients on USQTR and CCC_1Q2Q*USQTR implies that, for firms in industries whose 
cash conversion cycles are longer than one quarter and shorter than two quarters (CCC_1Q2Q = 
1), the change of mandatory reporting frequency from semi-annual to quarterly is associated with 
a 2.3% decrease in the odds of being a public firm, which is equivalent to a 0.06% decrease in 
the proportion of public firms from the mean. In contrast, for firms in the remaining industries 
whose cash conversion cycles are either shorter than the new reporting frequency or longer than 
the old reporting frequency, the change in mandatory reporting frequency is associated with a 31% 
increase in the odds of being a public firm, which translates to a 0.804% increase in the 
proportion of public firms from the mean. In other words, for industries whose cash conversion 
cycles are longer than the new reporting frequency and shorter than the old reporting frequency, 
the change in the mandatory reporting frequency resulted in an additional 0.864% (0.804% + 
0.060%) decrease in the proportion of public firms from the mean, compared to the 
corresponding change in other industries. The evidence suggests that, in the United States, the 
change of mandatory disclosure frequency from semi-annual to quarterly decreases, to a greater 
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extent than in other industries, the proportion of public firms in industries whose cash conversion 
cycles are between one quarter and two quarters. 
  
4.4.2 The UK sample 
Table 7 reports the percentage of firms in the three groups partitioned by industry median 
cash conversion cycle, measured using U.K. data between 2002 and 2006, when semi-annual 
reporting was required for U.K. public firms. The first three columns report results for U.K. 
firms. In the U.K., 83.5% of public firms are in industries whose median cash conversion cycles 
are less than one quarter during 2002 and 2006. The percentages are 16.3% and 0.2% for firms in 
industries with cash conversion cycles between one quarter and two quarters and those in 
industries with cash conversion cycles longer than two quarters, respectively. The corresponding 
percentages for the period between 2007 and 2011 are 84.6%, 15.2%, and 0.2%, respectively. 
The changes between the two sample periods are significant except for the group of firms whose 
industry median cash conversion cycles are longer than two quarters. The finding suggests that, 
after U.K. public firms were required to make quarterly reports in 2007, there was a significant 
change in industry composition. Industries whose median cash conversion cycles are between 
one quarter and two quarters 10  have a much lower representation in U.K. public firms. In 
contrast, industries whose median cash conversion cycles are shorter than one quarter have a 
higher representation in U.K. public firms. In the corresponding periods, there was no significant 
change in the representation of industries whose median cash conversion cycles are longer than 
two quarters in U.K. public firms. This group is affected to a lesser extent by the increase in the 
mandatory reporting frequency. 
                                                 
10 These industries include electrical, construction, textiles, drugs, cosmetics and health care, machinery and 
equipment, apparel, and aerospace. 
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 A potential reason for the decrease in the proportion of firms from industries whose cash 
conversion cycles are between one quarter and two quarters is their lesser economic importance. 
Therefore, we use the industry composition of public firms in the U.S. as a benchmark for 
economics-based industry composition. Interestingly, we find that in the United States there is no 
significant change in the distribution of public firms among the three groups, suggesting that 
these industries have not become less important economically.  
The last column of Table 7 reports the difference-in-differences comparison. Compared 
to their U.S. counterparts, U.K. firms in industries whose cash conversion cycles are between 
one quarter and two quarters (shorter than one quarter) have a significantly lower (higher) 
representation in public markets after public firms were required to make quarterly reports. 
Figure 1 plots the changes in the percentage of firms in each industry in the U.K. and the United 
States after U.K. public firms were required to make quarterly reports in 2007. Panel A reports 
the change for each industry in the U.K. and the United States separately. Panel B reports the 
change of percentage for each industry in the U.K. minus that in the United States. As evident 
from Panel B, during the 2007–2011 sample period, there is a marked decrease in the percentage 
of firms in industries such as construction, textiles, drugs, cosmetics and health care, machinery 
and equipment, and apparel. All those industries had cash conversion cycles between one quarter 
and two quarters prior to the change in the frequency of mandatory disclosure. 
  Table 8 reports the results of Regression (7). The variable of interest is the coefficient on 
UK*UKQTR, the interaction term between the indicator variable for U.K. firms and the indicator 
variable for mandatory quarterly reporting. As the second column shows, the coefficient on 
UK*UKQTR is −0.307 and statistically significant (Chi-square = 41.83) when the dependent 
variable is CCC_1Q2Q, the indicator variable for industries whose cash conversion cycles are 
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between one quarter and two quarters. The coefficient on UK*UKQTR is significantly positive 
(Chi-square = 38.84) when the dependent variable is CCC_1Q, the indicator variable for 
industries whose cash conversion cycles are shorter than one quarter, and is negative but 
statistically insignificant when the dependent variable is CCC_2Q, the indicator variable for 
industries whose cash conversion cycles are longer than two quarters. These results corroborate 
the findings in table 7 that industries with cash conversion cycles between one quarter and two 
quarters (shorter than one quarter) have a significantly lower (higher) representation in public 
markets after the U.K. adopted quarterly reporting.  
In summary, the difference-in-differences results in table 7 and table 8 generally support 
the conclusion that, after controlling for common factors that affect firms entering or leaving a 
particular industry, there is a net outflow of U.K. firms from the public markets in industries 
whose cash conversion cycles are longer than one quarter but shorter than two quarters in 
response to the increase in the frequency of mandatory reporting. Taking together the results 
using the U.S. and the U.K. samples, we observe that an increase in the frequency of mandatory 
reporting deters more firms from entering the public markets to avoid disclosure frequency 
induced myopia, especially in industries whose cash conversion cycles are shorter than the old 
reporting interval but longer than the new reporting interval. These results support Hypothesis 4. 
 
V. Conclusion  
This study provides new evidence on the economic consequences of the frequency of 
mandatory disclosure. We use the length of the cash conversion cycle as a proxy for the average 
length of cash payoffs from all projects and find that disclosure frequency induced myopia is 
present only when the cash conversion cycle is longer than the mandatory reporting interval and 
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that disclosure frequency induced myopia increases as price pressure from the public market 
increases. With respect to the influence of mandatory reporting on the decision to go public, this 
study finds that the incentive to stay private to avoid disclosure frequency induced myopia 
creates a downward kink in the relation between the length of cash conversion cycles and the 
proportion of public firms around the time frame that corresponds to the mandatory reporting 
interval at the industry level. In addition, at the firm level, public firms with cash conversion 
cycles longer than those of industry peers are more likely to list on exchanges that require less 
frequent mandatory disclosure to minimize disclosure frequency induced myopia. Finally, when 
mandatory reporting frequency increased from semi-annual to quarterly, we observe a sharper 
decline in the percentage of public firms from industries whose cash conversion cycles are 
between one quarter and two quarters compared to those from other industries both in the United 
States and in the U.K. 
The empirical results should be assessed with the caveat that this study adopts the 
assumption in Gigler et al. [2014] that there is no scope for informative accounting accruals. 
Therefore, one direction for future research would be to explore how accounting accruals might 
influence the relationship between the cash conversion cycle, disclosure frequency induced 
myopia, and the decision to be public. 
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Figure 1 Change in industry distributions among U.K. and U.S. firms after 
U.K. firms are required to make quarterly reports 
 
Panel A: By percentage of firms in each industry 
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Figure 1 
(continued) 
 
Panel B: Differences in the changes in the percentage of firms in each industry between the U.K. 
and the United States 
 
 
 
Note: CCC = cash conversion cycle.  
Panel A plots the changes in the percentage of firms in each industry in the U.K. and the United States after U.K. 
firms were required to make quarterly reports in 2007. The changes are calculated between two periods: 2002–06 
and 2007–11. Industry median cash conversion cycle is measured using all U.K. observations in Worldscope 
between 2002 and 2006 when semi-annual reporting was required. Cash conversion cycle is calculated as days’ sales 
outstanding (accounts receivable divided by daily sales) plus days’ sales in inventory (inventory divided by daily 
cost of goods sold) minus days’ sales in payables (accounts payable divided by daily cost of goods sold). Industries 
are defined by the two-digit industry group (Item 6011) in Worldscope. Financial industries (Item 6011 between 
4310 and 4395) are excluded. Panel B plots the differences in changes in the percentage of firms in each industry 
between the U.K. and the United States after U.K. firms were required to make quarterly reports in 2007. 
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Table 1 
Abnormal Research and Development Expenses in Groups Partitioned by Cash Conversion Cycle and 
Investor Impatience 
 
  CCC>1 quarter CCC<=1 quarter CCC>1 quarter – CCC<=1 quarter 
  N Mean Median N Mean Median Mean Median 
Full sample 130 -0.031 -0.034 239 0.006 -0.003 -0.037*** -0.031** 
              (-2.79) (-2.37) 
IMPATIENCE=1 68 -0.048 -0.045 118 0.004 -0.003 -0.052*** -0.042** 
 
            (-2.67) (-2.44) 
IMPATIENCE=0 62 -0.012 -0.010 121 0.008 0.005 -0.020 -0.015 
 
            (-1.10) (-0.84) 
“IMPATIENCE=1” – 
“IMPATIENCE=0” 
  -0.036*** -0.035**   -0.004 -0.008     
  (-2.54) (-2.23)   (-0.31) (-0.54)     
 
This table reports the mean and median abnormal research and development expenses in the year of seasoned equity offerings partitioned by cash conversion 
cycle and investor impatience (IMPATIENCE). Abnormal research and development expense is the residual from the following regression: 
𝑅𝑁𝐷𝑡
𝐴𝑆𝑆𝐸𝑇𝑆𝑡−1
=  𝛼0 +
𝛼1
1
𝐴𝑆𝑆𝐸𝑇𝑆𝑡−1
+ 𝛼2
𝑆𝐴𝐿𝐸𝑆𝑡−1
𝐴𝑆𝑆𝐸𝑇𝑆𝑡−1
+ 𝜀𝑡, where RNDt is research and development expense in year t. SALESt-1 and ASSETSt-1 are sales and total assets, respectively, in 
year t-1. The regression is estimated cross-sectionally by industry and year for the period from 1987 to 2015. We require that there be at least eight observations 
for every industry and year combination. Industries are defined by six-digit NAICS code. Financial firms (those for which the first two digits of the NAICS codes 
are 52 and 53) are excluded. Cash conversion cycle is calculated from Compustat as days’ sales outstanding (accounts receivable divided by daily sales) plus 
days’ sales in inventory (inventory divided by daily cost of goods sold) minus days’ sales in payables (accounts payable divided by daily cost of goods sold). We 
take the median cash conversion cycle over the previous five years to proxy for the normal level of cash conversion cycle for each firm-year. To measure 
IMPATIENCE, we estimate the following regression for each firm-year using past five years of data: 𝑅𝐸𝑇𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1
𝐶𝐹𝑂𝑞1
𝐴𝑆𝑆𝐸𝑇𝑆𝑡−1
+ 𝛽2
𝐶𝐹𝑂𝑞2−𝑞4
𝐴𝑆𝑆𝐸𝑇𝑆𝑡−1
+ 𝛽3
𝐶𝐹𝑂𝑡+1
𝐴𝑆𝑆𝐸𝑇𝑆𝑡−1
+
𝜇𝑡 , where RETt is the buy-hold return over the 12-month period starting four months after the end of fiscal year t-1; CFOq1, CFOq2-q4, and CFOt+1 are 
standardized cash flow from operations of the first quarter of year t, the second quarter to the fourth quarter of year t, and year t+1, respectively. IMPATIENCE 
equals one if the ratio abs(β1)/(abs(β2) + abs(β3)) is above the industry median, and zero otherwise. The seasoned equity offering sample is retrieved from the 
Thomson Reuters SDC New Issue database for the period from 1987 to 2015. The sample is restricted to firms listed on the New York Stock Exchange, the 
American Stock Exchange and NASDAQ and excludes initial public offerings, private placements, right issues, spin-offs, and unit issues. T-statistics and 
Wilcoxon z-statistics for the differences in mean and median are reported in the parentheses. ***, **, * denote statistical significance at 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 
levels, respectively, using a two-tailed test. 
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Table 2 
Summary Statistics on Cash Conversion Cycles and Industry Characteristics 
 
Panel A: Descriptive statistics 
  NUM_FIRMS_CENSUS PROPORTION INDUSTRY_CCC  INDUSTRY_GPM INDUSTRY_SALES 
N 5,842 5,842 5,842 5,842 5,842 
Mean 733 2.654 100.99 0.08 1,835.48 
Median 343 1.087 89.38 0.29 547.20 
Std 1,551 4.723 82.29 1.19 5,311.12 
Min  8 0.005 0.50 -18.92 0.01 
Max 22,180 90.343 4,070.63 0.80 106,661.87 
 
Panel B: Pearson (above diagonal) and Spearman (below diagonal) correlations 
  
LOG_ODDS 
INDUSTRY 
_CCC 
NUM_FIRMS 
_CENSUS 
INDUSTRY 
_GPM 
INDUSTRY 
_SALES 
POST_SFAS131 POST_SOX 
LOG_ODDS   0.033*** -0.496*** -0.170*** 0.176*** -0.053*** -0.092*** 
INDUSTRY_CCC 0.062***   -0.019 0.009 -0.094*** -0.034*** -0.076*** 
NUM_FIRMS_CENSUS -0.596*** 0.044***   0.025* -0.071*** 0.009 0.012 
INDUSTRY_GPM -0.158*** 0.199*** 0.037***   0.014 -0.048*** -0.062*** 
INDUSTRY_SALES 0.287*** -0.240*** -0.137*** -0.068***   0.062*** 0.110*** 
POST_SFAS131 -0.050*** -0.066*** 0.023* -0.024* 0.160***   0.448*** 
POST_SOX -0.086*** -0.117*** 0.038*** -0.024* 0.241*** 0.448***   
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Table 2 
(continued) 
 
Industries are defined by six-digit NAICS code. NUM_FIRMS_CENSUSit is the number of all firms, both private and public, obtained from the Census of 
Manufactures. As U.S. Census of Manufactures takes place every five years, we use the census data from a given year, not only for that year, but also for the two 
years immediately before and after it. The proportion of public firms (PROPORTIONit) is the percentage of public firms (obtained from Compustat) relative to 
NUM_FIRMS_CENSUSit for a given industry-year. The log odds of the proportion of public firms (LOG_ODDSit) is measured as Ln[PROPORTIONit / 
(1-PROPORTIONit)]. INDUSTRY_CCCit is the median length of the cash conversion cycles of public firms in year t for a given industry, where cash conversion 
cycle is calculated from Compustat as days’ sales outstanding (accounts receivable divided by daily sales) plus days’ sales in inventory (inventory divided by 
daily cost of goods sold) minus days’ sales in payables (accounts payable divided by daily cost of goods sold). INDUSTRY_GPMit is the average gross profit 
margin of public firms in year t for a given industry. INDUSTRY_SALESit is the average sales (in US$ millions) of public firms in year t for a given industry. 
POST_SFAS131t is an indicator variable, which equals one if the year is 1997 or later, and zero otherwise. POST_SOXt is an indicator variable, which equals 
one if the year is 2002 or later, and zero otherwise. ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 levels, respectively, using a two-tailed test. 
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Table 3 
Regression Results on the Proportion of Public Firms and the Length of Cash Conversion Cycles 
 
Explanatory Variables 
Dependent Variable  
= Ln [(PROPORTION / (1- PROPORTION)] 
INTERCEPT 
-4.208*** -5.441*** -5.505*** -5.806*** 
(-31.91) (-26.26) (-23.66) (-17.41) 
INDUSTRY_CCC 
0.000 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.006* 
(1.06) (3.13) (2.66) (1.93) 
CCC_LONG1Q 
    0.145** 0.469** 
    (1.97) (2.16) 
CCC_LONG1Q*INDUSTRY_CCC 
      -0.005** 
      (-2.48) 
NUM_FIRMS_CENSUS 
-0.458*** -0.426*** -0.424*** -0.425*** 
(-6.38) (-6.31) (-6.35) (-6.32) 
Ln(INDUSTRY_SALES) 
  0.246*** 0.251*** 0.251*** 
  (5.86) (5.74) (5.65) 
INDUSTRY_GPM 
  -0.217*** -0.216*** -0.215*** 
  (-4.89) (-5.04) (-5.08) 
POST_SFAS131 
  -0.154*** -0.153*** -0.150*** 
  (-5.67) (-5.94) (-6.62) 
POST_SOX 
  -0.402*** -0.397*** -0.394*** 
  (-3.48) (-3.42) (-3.42) 
Adjusted R-squared 24.68% 35.76% 35.94% 36.15% 
N 5,842 5,842 5,842 5,842 
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Table 3 
(continued) 
 
This table presents the regression results from Regression (3): 
 
𝐿𝑂𝐺_𝑂𝐷𝐷𝑆𝑖𝑡 = ∝ + 𝛽1𝐼𝑁𝐷𝑈𝑆𝑇𝑅𝑌_𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2𝐶𝐶𝐶_𝐿𝑂𝑁𝐺1𝑄𝑖𝑡 +  𝜷𝟑𝑪𝑪𝑪_𝑳𝑶𝑵𝑮𝟏𝑸𝒊𝒕 ∗ 𝑰𝑵𝑫𝑼𝑺𝑻𝑹𝒀_𝑪𝑪𝑪𝒊𝒕  + 𝛽4𝑁𝑈𝑀_𝐹𝐼𝑅𝑀𝑆_𝐶𝐸𝑁𝑆𝑈𝑆𝑖𝑡
+ 𝛽5𝐿𝑛(𝐼𝑁𝐷𝑈𝑆𝑇𝑅𝑌_𝑆𝐴𝐿𝐸𝑆)𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽6𝐼𝑁𝐷𝑈𝑆𝑇𝑅𝑌_𝐺𝑃𝑀𝑖𝑡  +  𝛽7𝑃𝑂𝑆𝑇_𝑆𝐹𝐴𝑆131𝑡 +  𝛽8𝑃𝑂𝑆𝑇_𝑆𝑂𝑋𝑡 + 𝜺𝒊𝒕 
 
Industries are defined by six-digit NAICS code. NUM_FIRMS_CENSUSit is the number of all firms (in thousands), both private and public, obtained from the 
Census of Manufactures. As U.S. Census of Manufactures takes place every five years, we use the census data from a given year, not only for that year, but also 
for the two years immediately before and after it. The proportion of public firms (PROPORTIONit) is the percentage of public firms (obtained from Compustat) 
relative to NUM_FIRMS_CENSUSit for a given industry-year. The log odds of the proportion of public firms (LOG_ODDSit) is measured as 
Ln[PROPORTIONit / (1-PROPORTIONit)]. INDUSTRY_CCCit is the median length of the cash conversion cycles of public firms in year t for a given industry, 
where cash conversion cycle is calculated from Compustat as days’ sales outstanding (accounts receivable divided by daily sales) plus days’ sales in inventory 
(inventory divided by daily cost of goods sold) minus days’ sales in payables (accounts payable divided by daily cost of goods sold). CCC_LONG1Qit is an 
indicator variable for long cash conversion cycle, which equals one if INDUSTRY_CCC is longer than one quarter, and zero otherwise. INDUSTRY_GPMit is 
the average gross profit margin of public firms in year t for a given industry. Ln(INDUSTRY_SALESit) is the logarithm of the average sales (in US$ millions) of 
public firms in year t for a given industry. POST_SFAS131t is an indicator variable, which equals one if the year is 1997 or later, and zero otherwise. 
POST_SOXt is an indicator variable, which equals one if the year is 2002 or later, and zero otherwise. The t-statistics (in parentheses) are adjusted for two-way 
cluster-robust standard errors (clustered by industry and census year). ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 levels, respectively, using 
a two-tailed test. 
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Table 4 
Regression Results on the Proportion of Public Firms and Components of Cash Conversion Cycles 
 
Explanatory Variables 
Dependent Variable  
= Ln [(PROPORTION / (1- PROPORTION)] 
INTERCEPT 
-5.938*** -5.597*** -5.811*** -6.039*** 
(-19.30) (-24.81) (-29.11) (-20.63) 
CCC_LONG1Q 
0.588*** 0.091 0.281** 0.398** 
(3.65) (0.48) (2.52) (2.08) 
INDUSTRY_DSI 
0.008***     0.007* 
(3.74)     (1.93) 
CCC_LONG1Q*INDUSTRY_DSI 
-0.007***     -0.007** 
(-3.58)     (-2.01) 
INDUSTRY_DSO 
  0.003   0.001 
  (0.76)   (0.29) 
CCC_LONG1Q*INDUSTRY_DSO 
  0.001   0.001 
  (0.20)   (0.36) 
INDUSTRY_DPO 
    0.008** 0.003 
    (2.39) (0.67) 
CCC_LONG1Q*INDUSTRY_DPO 
    -0.002 0.001 
    (-1.06) (0.32) 
NUM_FIRMS_CENSUS 
-0.420*** -0.428*** -0.421*** -0.423*** 
(-6.32) (-6.66) (-6.31) (-6.55) 
Ln(INDUSTRY_SALES) 
0.255*** 0.251*** 0.256*** 0.258*** 
(5.69) (5.50) (6.02) (5.49) 
INDUSTRY_GPM 
-0.220*** -0.219*** -0.209*** -0.219*** 
(-5.25) (-5.48) (-4.91) (-5.38) 
POST_SFAS131 
-0.158*** -0.150*** -0.159*** -0.157*** 
(-5.27) (-6.55) (-5.70) (-6.18) 
POST_SOX 
-0.396*** -0.400*** -0.406*** -0.405*** 
(-3.40) (-3.52) (-3.41) (-3.50) 
Adjusted R-squared 36.85% 36.23% 36.87% 37.43% 
N 5,842 5,842 5,842 5,842 
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Table 4 
(continued) 
 
This table presents the regression results from Regression (4): 
 
𝐿𝑂𝐺_𝑂𝐷𝐷𝑆𝑖𝑡 = ∝ + 𝛽1𝐶𝐶𝐶_𝐿𝑂𝑁𝐺1𝑄𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2𝐼𝑁𝐷𝑈𝑆𝑇𝑅𝑌_𝐷𝑆𝐼𝑖𝑡 + 𝜷𝟑𝑪𝑪𝑪_𝑳𝑶𝑵𝑮𝟏𝑸𝒊𝒕 ∗ 𝑰𝑵𝑫𝑼𝑺𝑻𝑹𝒀_𝑫𝑺𝑰𝒊𝒕 + 𝛽4𝐼𝑁𝐷𝑈𝑆𝑇𝑅𝑌_𝐷𝑆𝑂𝑖𝑡
+ 𝜷𝟓𝑪𝑪𝑪_𝑳𝑶𝑵𝑮𝟏𝑸𝒊𝒕 ∗ 𝑰𝑵𝑫𝑼𝑺𝑻𝑹𝒀_𝑫𝑺𝑶𝒊𝒕 + 𝛽6𝐼𝑁𝐷𝑈𝑆𝑇𝑅𝑌_𝐷𝑃𝑂𝑖𝑡 + 𝜷𝟕𝑪𝑪𝑪_𝑳𝑶𝑵𝑮𝟏𝑸𝒊𝒕 ∗ 𝑰𝑵𝑫𝑼𝑺𝑻𝑹𝒀_𝑫𝑷𝑶𝒊𝒕
+ 𝛽8𝑁𝑈𝑀_𝐹𝐼𝑅𝑀𝑆_𝐶𝐸𝑁𝑆𝑈𝑆𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽9𝐿𝑛(𝐼𝑁𝐷𝑈𝑆𝑇𝑅𝑌_𝑆𝐴𝐿𝐸𝑆)𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽10𝐼𝑁𝐷𝑈𝑆𝑇𝑅𝑌_𝐺𝑃𝑀𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽11𝑃𝑂𝑆𝑇_𝑆𝐹𝐴𝑆131𝑡 + 𝛽12𝑃𝑂𝑆𝑇_𝑆𝑂𝑋𝑡 + 𝜺𝒊𝒕 
 
Industries are defined by six-digit NAICS code. NUM_FIRMS_CENSUSit is the number of all firms (in thousands), both private and public, obtained from the 
Census of Manufactures. As U.S. Census of Manufactures takes place every five years, we use the census data from a given year, not only for that year, but also 
for the two years immediately before and after it. The proportion of public firms (PROPORTIONit) is the percentage of public firms (obtained from Compustat) 
relative to NUM_FIRMS_CENSUSit for a given industry-year. The log odds of the proportion of public firms (LOG_ODDSit) is measured as 
Ln[PROPORTIONit / (1-PROPORTIONit)]. INDUSTRY_DSIit is the median days’ sales in inventory of public firms in year t for a given industry, which is 
calculated as inventory divided by daily cost of goods sold. INDUSTRY_DSOit is the median days’ sales outstanding in accounts receivable of public firms in 
year t for a given industry, which is calculated as accounts receivable divided by daily sales. INDUSTRY_DPOit is the median days’ sales in accounts payable of 
public firms in year t for a given industry, which is calculated as accounts payable divided by daily cost of goods sold. INDUSTRY_CCCit is the median length 
of the cash conversion cycles of public firms in year t for a given industry, which is calculated as days’ sales outstanding plus days’ sales in inventory minus 
days’ sales in payables. CCC_LONG1Qit is an indicator variable for long cash conversion cycle, which equals one if INDUSTRY_CCC is longer than one 
quarter, and zero otherwise. INDUSTRY_GPMit is the average gross profit margin of public firms in year t for a given industry. Ln(INDUSTRY_SALESit) is the 
logarithm of the average sales (in US$ millions) of public firms in year t for a given industry. POST_SFAS131t is an indicator variable, which equals one if the 
year is 1997 or later, and zero otherwise. POST_SOXt is an indicator variable, which equals one if the year is 2002 or later, and zero otherwise. The t-statistics 
(in parentheses) are adjusted for two-way cluster-robust standard errors (clustered by industry and census year). ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at 
0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 levels, respectively, using a two-tailed test. 
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Table 5 
Length of Cash Conversion Cycle and Listing Markets for U.K. Firms 
 
Panel A: Descriptive statistics 
    CCC CCC_DM1 CCC_DM2 ROA SALES 
Full Sample 
(N=8,120) 
Mean -22.79 -1.91 0.00 -0.08 1,334.15 
Median 44.34 61.80 65.32 0.05 66.09 
USLIST=1 
(N=574) 
Mean -57.66 -27.06 -25.40 -0.08 6,591.98 
Median 47.31 57.00 58.00 0.07 2,872.99 
USLIST=0 
(N=7,546) 
Mean -20.14 0.00 1.93 -0.08 934.20 
Median 43.94 62.10 66.00 0.05 55.31 
USLIST=1 –
USLIST=0 
Mean -37.52 -27.06 -27.33 0.01 5,657.78*** 
  (-1.23) (-0.90) (-0.91) (0.09) (14.88) 
Median 3.37 -5.10 -7.99 0.02*** 2,817.68*** 
  (0.81) (-0.30) (-0.66) (6.64) (24.54) 
 
Panel B: Logistic regressions 
 
Dependent Variable: USLIST 
Intercept -5.556*** -5.508*** -5.506*** 
  (1,334.78) (1,331.85) (1,332.01) 
CCC -0.038***     
  (36.31)     
CCC_DM1   -0.029***   
    (16.78)   
CCC_DM2     -0.029*** 
      (16.48) 
ROA -0.311*** -0.316*** -0.316*** 
  (34.15) (33.47) (33.46) 
Ln (SALES) 0.523*** 0.516*** 0.516*** 
  (606.79) (598.28) (598.18) 
N 8,120 8,120 8,120 
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Table 5 
(continued) 
 
Panel B presents the logistic regression results from Regression (5): 
𝑈𝑆𝐿𝐼𝑆𝑇𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝜷𝟏𝑪𝑪𝑪𝒊𝒕 + 𝛽2𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽3𝐿𝑛(𝑆𝐴𝐿𝐸𝑆)𝑖𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡 
𝑈𝑆𝐿𝐼𝑆𝑇𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝜷𝟏𝑪𝑪𝑪_𝑫𝑴𝟏𝒊𝒕 + 𝛽2𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽3𝐿𝑛(𝑆𝐴𝐿𝐸𝑆)𝑖𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡 
𝑈𝑆𝐿𝐼𝑆𝑇𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝜷𝟏𝑪𝑪𝑪_𝑫𝑴𝟐𝒊𝒕 + 𝛽2𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽3𝐿𝑛(𝑆𝐴𝐿𝐸𝑆)𝑖𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡 
 
The sample period is from 2002 to 2006. Industries are defined by two-digit industry group (Item 6011) in Worldscope. Financial industries (Item 6011 between 
4310 and 4395) are excluded. USLIST is an indicator variable, which equals one for firms domiciled in the U.K. and listed on the U.S. markets, and zero for 
firms domiciled in the U.K. and listed on the U.K. markets. Cash conversion cycle is calculated as days’ sales outstanding (accounts receivable divided by daily 
sales) plus days’ sales in inventory (inventory divided by daily cost of goods sold) minus days’ sales in payables (accounts payable divided by daily cost of goods 
sold). CCC_DM1 is firms’ cash conversion cycle minus industry average cash conversion cycle, where industry average cash conversion cycle is computed every 
year using the firms domiciled in the U.K. and listed on the U.K. markets. CCC_DM2 is firms’ cash conversion cycle minus industry average cash conversion 
cycle, where industry average cash conversion cycle is computed every year using the firms domiciled in the U.K. and listed in the U.S. and U.K. markets. 
Return on assets (ROA) is operating income (Item 1250) divided by total assets (Item 2999). SALES is net revenue in US$ millions (Item 7240/$1,000,000) and 
Ln(SALES) is the logarithm of SALES. T-statistics and Wilcoxon z-statistics for the differences in mean and median are reported in the parentheses. In panel B, 
CCC, CCC_DM1, and CCC_DM2 are scaled by 100. The numbers in the parentheses are chi-square statistics. ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at 0.01, 
0.05, and 0.10 levels, respectively, using a two-tailed test. 
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Table 6 
Impact of Change in Reporting Frequency in the United States on the Proportion of Public Firms   
 
Explanatory Variables 
Dependent Variable  
= Ln [(PROPORTION / (1- PROPORTION)] 
INTERCEPT 
-3.940*** -5.757*** -6.207*** 
(-15.88) (-10.47) (-10.65) 
INDUSTRY_CCC 
0.002 0.000 0.001 
(1.15) (0.09) (0.33) 
USQTR 
    0.270*** 
    (3.42) 
CCC_1Q2Q 
    0.422* 
    (2.21) 
CCC_1Q2Q*USQTR 
    -0.293** 
    (-2.36) 
NUM_FIRMS_CENSUS 
-0.512*** -0.524*** -0.511*** 
(-5.41) (-5.76) (-5.91) 
Ln(INDUSTRY_SALES) 
  0.325*** 0.323*** 
  (4.09) (4.03) 
INDUSTRY_GPM 
  1.607* 1.869** 
  (2.12) (2.32) 
Adjusted R-squared 36.49% 45.90% 47.27% 
N 880 880 880 
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Table 6 
(continued) 
 
This table presents the regression results from Regression (6): 
 
𝐿𝑂𝐺_𝑂𝐷𝐷𝑆𝑖𝑡 = ∝ + 𝛽1𝐼𝑁𝐷𝑈𝑆𝑇𝑅𝑌_𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑈𝑆𝑄𝑇𝑅𝑡 +  𝛽3𝐶𝐶𝐶_1𝑄2𝑄𝑖 +  𝜷𝟒𝑪𝑪𝑪_𝟏𝑸𝟐𝑸𝒊 ∗ 𝑼𝑺𝑸𝑻𝑹𝒕  + 𝛽5𝑁𝑈𝑀_𝐹𝐼𝑅𝑀𝑆_𝐶𝐸𝑁𝑆𝑈𝑆𝑖𝑡
+ 𝛽6𝐿𝑛(𝐼𝑁𝐷𝑈𝑆𝑇𝑅𝑌_𝑆𝐴𝐿𝐸𝑆)𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽7𝐼𝑁𝐷𝑈𝑆𝑇𝑅𝑌_𝐺𝑃𝑀𝑖𝑡 +  +𝜺𝒊𝒕 
 
Industries are defined by four-digit SIC code. NUM_FIRMS_CENSUSit is the number of all firms (in thousands), both private and public, obtained from the 
Census of Manufactures. As U.S. Census of Manufactures takes place every five years, we use the census data from a given year, not only for that year, but also 
for the two years immediately before and after it. The proportion of public firms (PROPORTIONit) is the percentage of public firms (obtained from Compustat) 
relative to NUM_FIRMS_CENSUSit for a given industry-year. The log odds of the proportion of public firms (LOG_ODDSit) is measured as 
Ln[PROPORTIONit / (1-PROPORTIONit)]. INDUSTRY_CCCit is the median length of the cash conversion cycles of public firms in year t for a given industry, 
where the cash conversion cycle is calculated as days’ sales outstanding (accounts receivable divided by daily sales) plus days’ sales in inventory (inventory 
divided by daily cost of goods sold) minus days’ sales in payables (accounts payable divided by daily cost of goods sold). USQTRt is an indicator variable, which 
equals one if the year is between 1970 and 1974, and zero if the year is between 1965 and 1969. CCC_1Q2Q i is an indicator variable, which equals one if the 
industry median cash conversion cycle measured between 1965 and 1969 is longer than one quarter and shorter than two quarters, and zero otherwise. 
INDUSTRY_GPMit is the average gross profit margin of public firms in year t for a given industry. Ln(INDUSTRY_SALESit) is the logarithm of the average 
sales (in US$ millions) of public firms in year t for a given industry. The t-statistics (in parentheses) are adjusted for two-way cluster-robust standard errors 
(clustered by industry and year). ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 levels, respectively, using a two-tailed test. 
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Table 7 
Percentage of Firms in Groups Partitioned by Industry Median Cash Conversion Cycle  
 
 
U.K. United States 
Difference-in-
Differences 
  
2002-2006 2007-2011 Diff. 2002-2006 2007-2011 Diff. 
  
INDUSTRY_CCC < 1 quarter 
0.835 0.846 0.011** 0.798 0.797 -0.001 0.012* 
  (2.021)   (-0.208) (1.782) 
1 quarter <= INDUSTRY_CCC <= 2 quarters 
0.163 0.152 -0.011* 0.201 0.201 0.000 -0.011* 
  (-1.957)   (0.227) (-1.735) 
2 quarters < INDUSTRY_CCC 
0.002 0.002 0.000 0.001 0.002 0.001 -0.001 
  (0.687)   (0.178) (-0.547) 
N 9,148 8,069   42,859 38,063     
 
This table presents the percentage of U.K. and U.S. firms in the three groups partitioned by industry median cash conversion cycle (INDUSTRY_CCC), which is 
measured using all U.K. observations in Worldscope between 2000 and 2006, when semi-annual reporting was required. Cash conversion cycle is calculated as 
days’ sales outstanding (accounts receivable divided by daily sales) plus days’ sales in inventory (inventory divided by daily cost of goods sold) minus days’ 
sales in payables (accounts payable divided by daily cost of goods sold). Industries are defined by two-digit industry group (Item 6011) in Worldscope. Financial 
industries (Item 6011 between 4310 and 4395) are excluded. The numbers in parentheses are t-statistics. ***, **, and * denote significance at 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 
levels, respectively, using a two-tailed test. 
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Table 8 
Difference-in-Differences Comparison of Change in Industry Distributions between the U.K. and the United 
States 
 
  
 
 
Dependent variable 
= CCC_1Q 
Dependent variable  
= CCC_1Q2Q 
Dependent variable 
= CCC_2Q 
Intercept -20.775*** 22.628*** -237.000*** 
  (3,587.85) (4,015.13) (367.86) 
UK 1.074*** -1.156*** 0.573 
  (939.43) (1,056.77) (0.16) 
UKQTR -0.471*** 0.512*** -2.820*** 
  (587.31) (680.17) (97.19) 
UK*UKQTR 0.293*** -0.307*** -2.608 
  (38.84) (41.83) (0.15) 
INDUSTRY_GPM 3.294*** -3.534*** 27.548*** 
  (1,463.81) (1,656.75) (208.40) 
Ln(INDUSTRY_SALES) 1.004*** -1.090*** 9.917*** 
  (3,966.67) (4,397.35) (359.05) 
N 98,139 98,139 98,139 
 
This table presents the logistic regression results from Regression (7): 
𝐶𝐶𝐶_1𝑄𝑖 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝑈𝐾𝑖 + 𝛽2𝑈𝐾𝑄𝑇𝑅𝑡 + 𝜷𝟑𝑼𝑲𝒊 ∗ 𝑼𝑲𝑸𝑻𝑹𝒕 + 𝛽4𝐼𝑁𝐷𝑈𝑆𝑇𝑅𝑌_𝐺𝑃𝑀𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽5𝐿𝑛(𝐼𝑁𝐷𝑈𝑆𝑇𝑅𝑌_𝑆𝐴𝐿𝐸𝑆)𝑖𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡 
𝐶𝐶𝐶_1𝑄2𝑄𝑖 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝑈𝐾𝑖 + 𝛽2𝑈𝐾𝑄𝑇𝑅𝑡 + 𝜷𝟑𝑼𝑲𝒊 ∗ 𝑼𝑲𝑸𝑻𝑹𝒕 + 𝛽4𝐼𝑁𝐷𝑈𝑆𝑇𝑅𝑌_𝐺𝑃𝑀𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽5𝐿𝑛(𝐼𝑁𝐷𝑈𝑆𝑇𝑅𝑌_𝑆𝐴𝐿𝐸𝑆)𝑖𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡 
𝐶𝐶𝐶_2𝑄𝑖 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝑈𝐾𝑖 + 𝛽2𝑈𝐾𝑄𝑇𝑅𝑡 + 𝜷𝟑𝑼𝑲𝒊 ∗ 𝑼𝑲𝑸𝑻𝑹𝒕 + 𝛽4𝐼𝑁𝐷𝑈𝑆𝑇𝑅𝑌_𝐺𝑃𝑀𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽5𝐿𝑛(𝐼𝑁𝐷𝑈𝑆𝑇𝑅𝑌_𝑆𝐴𝐿𝐸𝑆)𝑖𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡 
 
CCC_1Q, CCC_1Q2Q, and CCC_2Q are indicator variables that equal one if the firm belongs to industries whose median cash conversion cycle 
(INDUSTRY_CCC) is less than one quarter, between one quarter and two quarters, or more than two quarters, respectively, and zero otherwise. 
INDUSTRY_CCC is measured using all U.K. observations in Worldscope between 2002 and 2006, when semi-annual reporting was required. Cash conversion 
cycle is calculated as days’ sales outstanding (accounts receivable divided by daily sales) plus days’ sales in inventory (inventory divided by daily cost of goods 
sold) minus days’ sales in payables (accounts payable divided by daily cost of goods sold). UK is an indicator variable that equals one for U.K. firms and zero for 
U.S. firms. UKQTR is an indictor variable that equals one for observations between 2007 and 2011, and zero for observations between 2002 and 2006. 
INDUSTRY_GPM is the average gross profit margin ((Item 1001 – Item1051)/Item1001) of public firms in a given industry. Ln(INDUSTRY_SALES) is the 
logarithm of the average sales (Item 7240) of public firms in a given industry. Industries are defined by two-digit industry group (Item 6011) in Worldscope. 
Financial industries (Item 6011 between 4310 and 4395) are excluded. The numbers in parentheses are chi-square statistics. ***, **, and * denote statistical 
significance at 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 levels, respectively, using a two-tailed test.  
